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LAWFUL RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION?
THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION’S ALMIGHTY SPILLAGE OVER THE GRAYER NONMINISTERIAL AREAS

Oliver Encarnacion

I. INTRODUCTION

In response to historical societal movements producing differential treatment of race,
gender, and sexual orientation, courts across the nation have both granted and refused exceptions
for religious groups from civil rights laws against such discrimination.1 While Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) protects against discrimination based on race, religion,
gender, and national origin, the First Amendment’s “Ministerial Exception’’ shields churches
from the prohibition of discrimination based on religion under that statute and any other
enactments.2 Likewise, Title VII grants much broader exceptions through §702 to allow certain
religious groups under particular circumstances to do the same.3

This Note will accept the Ministerial Exception, recognizing that the constitutional
freedom of any institution deemed a “church” to select ministers or clergy without interference
from the government or Title VII’s restrictions is, to a great extent, logical and acceptable.

Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 781 (2007)
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 (West 2014).
3
Id. § 2000e-1(a).
1
2

2

Otherwise, such intrusion could potentially trample upon religious rights.

Rather, this Note addresses the often arbitrary application of Title VII’s exceptions
regarding employment decisions by other religious organizations, not churches, affecting other
positions, not ministerial, within the religious organization. Part II of this Note provides a basic
description and background of the Ministerial Exception and Title VII’s statutory exceptions,
laying out their application requirements, constitutional grounds, and scope of immunity. Part II
also addresses and highlights the differences that distinguish them.

Part III examines how the impact of the Ministerial Exception's absolute immunity on the
operation of Title VII exceptions’ partial immunity in effect allows religious organizations to
discriminate on a basis other than religion, particularly sex. This is despite the fact that such
discrimination is explicitly prohibited, unless such discrimination is justified as “a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that” religious
organization.4 In other words, even though a religious organization may be able to consider an
applicant or employee’s religion without violating Title VII, such organization may in effect
violate the statute by considering the individual’s sex, for instance, under the guise of religion.5

II.

MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION VS. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS

Id. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(1); see also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh–Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1166-67 (4th Cir.1985).
5
Id. § 2000e-1(a).
4
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A.

The Ministerial Exception: Absolute Protection Granted by the Constitution

The Ministerial Exception is a constitutional doctrine rooted in both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause.6 It applies primarily to churches’ selection of ministers,
granting a protection afforded by the First Amendment of the Constitution.7 The Supreme Court
long recognized that the “freedom to select the clergy” has “federal constitutional protection as
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference,”8 but that right was most absolutely
and clearly stated in the Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. Perich, which made clear that the right is absolute.9 In its quest to protect religious
organizations’ right to choose spiritual leaders, the Exception, where applicable, trumps all
federal and state anti-discrimination laws.10 Thus, if a defendant is deemed a church and the
position at issue is ministerial, the right is absolute, both at the federal and state level, and little
can be done to redress religious discrimination against employees.11

Since Title VII’s statutory nondiscriminatory requirements may interfere with the
constitutional freedom specific to clergy, the Ministerial Exception, as a constitutional and thus
unyielding protection, reconciles Title VII with the First Amendment by allowing religious

6

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012).
Id. at 697; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). For an analysis of the extent to which the judiciary
may decide religious disputes see CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., APPLICATION OF RELIGIOUS LAW
IN U.S. COURTS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2011), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41824.pdf.
9
132 S. Ct. at 706.
10
Id.
11
Id.
7
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organizations to select clergy without regard to any of Title VII’s restrictions.12 If, however, the
Ministerial Exception does not apply either because the employer is not a church or the position
at issue is not ministerial, the inquiry as to whether any discrimination protection applies
branches out to any of the other potentially viable statutory exceptions. Thus, employment
decisions regarding other positions within the organization may still have to comply with Title
VII’s statutory requirements.

1. The U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to set the tone and lay the framework for the
Ministerial Exception through Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. Perich

When the Supreme Court first faced the potential for impermissible review of
ecclesiastical decisions, it avoided the issue.13 In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton
Christian Schools, decided in 1985, the plaintiff, a pregnant teacher, was married.14 However,
when she became pregnant, the Dayton Christian Schools decided not to renew her teaching
contract.15 The schools' sponsoring churches adhered to the view that a mother of young children
should not work outside the home.16 The teacher retained a lawyer who informed the school that
it was violating federal and state anti-discrimination law.17 The school then fired the teacher for
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–1(a) (West 2014); see also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir.1972)
(holding that Congress left to the judiciary the task of deciding how Title VII applies to religious organizations. The
judiciary's response, first articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was to create a “ministerial
exception,” which exempted the employment relationship between churches and their ministers from Title VII);
Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947–49 (3d Cir.1991) (subjecting religious employer to a claim of religious
discrimination would raise substantial questions under the Religion Clauses); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; Rayburn,
772 F.2d at 1167 (“perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its values,
teach its message, and interpret its doctrines”).
13
See generally Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619 (1985).
14
Id. at 623.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
12
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violating its practice of Biblical Chain of Command, a belief that all disputes involving members
of the church should be resolved within the church.18

Following this action, the teacher filed a sex discrimination complaint with the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission.19 The school then filed its own lawsuit in federal court, arguing that its free
exercise of religion prohibited the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or
“Commission”) from investigating discrimination claims at the school.20 Even though the school
lost in the district court, the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.21 But the
Court did not reach the merits of the claim, instead concluding that the federal courts should not
have interfered in the ongoing state proceedings.22

When the Supreme Court reviewed Hosanna-Tabor almost thirty years later, it
recognized the Ministerial Exception for the first time.23 In Hosanna-Tabor, the EEOC brought
an action against a Lutheran church on behalf of a “called” teacher, alleging that the church’s
school fired the teacher in retaliation for threatening to file an Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) lawsuit following a “proposed release” (i.e. discharge) allegedly due to a narcolepsy
diagnosis and symptoms.24 The teacher claimed unlawful retaliation under both the ADA and
state law.25 The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in
favor of the congregation and subsequently denied reconsideration, but the Sixth Circuit vacated

Id.
Dayton, 477 U.S. at 623-24.
20
Id. at 624-25.
21
Id. at 625, 629.
22
Id. at 625.
23
132 S. Ct. at 706.
24
Id. at 700-01.
25
Id. at 701.
18
19
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and remanded.26 However, the Supreme Court reversed, first recognizing the Ministerial
Exception operated as an affirmative defense to conduct that would otherwise violate the statute
and then holding that a “called” teacher is a “minister” within the Ministerial Exception.27

Since the members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers, the
Supreme Court held that requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister or punishing
a church for failing to do so intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.28 Such action
interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.29 By imposing an unwanted minister, the state
infringes upon the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own
faith and mission through its appointments.30 It also infringes the Establishment Clause, which
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.31

a) Ministerial Employees

Given the Ministerial Exception's constitutional nature, circuit courts across the nation
recognized the Exception long before Hosanna Tabor.32 However, the circuit courts had differed

582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008), vacated, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012).
27
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707-710.
28
Id. at 706.
29
Id.
30
Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
32
See, e.g., Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d
198 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conf. of the United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007); AliceaHernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.
2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. Of Amer., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
26

7

on the scope of the Exception, particularly in regards to which employees qualify as ministerial
employees.33 Pragmatically, “churches” and “ministers” are both terms of art. While the
definitions of church and minister have been judicially defined, many employees working for
religiously-affiliated employers are not considered ministers.34 Hosanna Tabor declined to
“adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister,” deciding only the
status of the employee in the case before it.35 Although the Supreme Court has not identified a
definitive standard, it considered four factors that may be relevant to determining whether an
employee is ministerial: (1) the formal title given to the employee by the religious institution; (2)
the substantive actions reflected by the title (i.e., the qualifications required to be granted such a
title); (3) the employee’s understanding and use of the title; and (4) the important religious
functions performed by the employees holding that title.36

Although the Court did not set out a specific test, the Court noted in Hosanna-Tabor that
(1) the Church held out Perich, a “called teacher” — different from “lay” or “contract” teachers
who are not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran — to be a minister, (2)
the Church had a ceremony and the congregation was involved in her investiture, (3) Perich had
significant religious training as a prerequisite, (4) Perich held herself out to be a minister and
even took a special tax deduction applicable only to members of a ministry, and (5) her duties
involved significant religious teaching activities.37 Based on that, the Court decided that Perich
met the standards of the Ministerial Exception.38 However, the Court was careful to note that the

Id.
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
35
Id. at 707.
36
Id. at 708.
37
Id. at 700, 708-09.
38
Id. at 709.
33
34
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term "minister" was misleading because the Exception also applies to religions that do not label
their spiritual leaders “ministers.”39

Moreover, the Court refused to address the "parade of horribles" that the EEOC presented
in its arguments against a broad Exception.40 The EEOC and Perich claimed that recognizing the
Ministerial Exception in employment discrimination suits would confer on religious employers
“unfettered discretion” to violate employment laws by protecting such organizations from
liability for actions such as hiring children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States
and retaliating against employees for reporting criminal misconduct or for testifying before a
grand jury or in a criminal trial.41 Hosanna-Tabor, on the other hand, argued that the Exception
had been recognized in the lower courts for forty years and, because it applied only to suits by or
on behalf of ministers themselves, had not given rise to the dire consequences that the EEOC and
Perich predicted.42 Focusing solely on the employment discrimination suit before it, brought on
behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision to fire her, the Supreme Court construed
its holding narrowly by ruling only that the Ministerial Exception bars suits of that nature.43 In
other words, the Supreme Court avoided deciding the applicability of the Exception under other
circumstances.44

B.

Title VII and its Statutory Exceptions

Id. at 711-12 (Alito, J., concurring).
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
39
40
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1. Title VII’s Prohibition of Discrimination and Exceptions

Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against someone on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex or to retaliate against a person because the person
complained about discrimination, filed a charge, or participated in an employment discrimination
investigation or lawsuit.45 Employers with fewer than fifteen employees are exempt.46

While prohibiting employment discrimination on other grounds, sections 702 and 703 of
Title VII include several much broader exceptions for religious organizations, regardless of
whether the organization is a “church” or the employee a “minister.”47 Through §702, religious
organizations have been granted congressional permission to discriminate based on religion.48 In
other words, Title VII’s prohibition against religious discrimination does not apply to “a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment, i.e., hiring and retention, of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.”49 However, the exception is limited on its face to allowing such
employers to hire and retain “individuals of a particular religion.”50 The Supreme Court has
unanimously upheld the constitutionality of exceptions allowing a religiously affiliated not-forprofit entity to make employment decisions based on religion, even if the position is related to a

45

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2014).
Id.
47
Id. §§ 2000e-1, 2000e-2(e)(2).
48
Id.
49
Id. § 2000e-1(a).
50
Id.
46
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non-religious activity of the organization.51

In addition, faith-based service providers are also eligible for the exception as long as
they fit within the definition.52 However, if such organizations receive government funding, the
funds cannot be used to advance the organization’s religious practices.53 Furthermore, in the
context of Title VII, the exceptions in Sections 702 and 703 for religious organizations, unlike
the Ministerial Exception rooted in the Constitution, are not absolute because the exceptions do
not allow qualifying organizations to discriminate on any other basis forbidden by Title VII (i.e.,
race, color, sex/gender, and national origin).54 Thus, although a religious organization may
consider an employee or applicant’s religion without violating Title VII, the organization may
still violate Title VII if it considers the individual’s race, color, national origin, or sex.55
Moreover, the exceptions in Title VII appear to apply only with respect to employment
decisions regarding hiring and firing of employees based on religion.56 Once an organization
decides to employ an individual, the organization may not discriminate on the basis of religion
regarding the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, privileges,
etc.57 In other words, religious organizations that decide to hire individuals with other religious
beliefs cannot later choose to discriminate against those individuals with regard to wages or other
benefits that the organization provides to employees.58

51

Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 333 (1987).
Id.
53
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
54
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1(a) (West 2014); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166–67.
55
See E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982); E.E.O.C. NOTICE, N-915, September
23, 1987.
56
E.E.O.C. NOTICE, N-915, September 23, 1987.
57
Id.
58
Id.
52
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a)

Religious Organizations

Problematic enough, the statute does not particularly define “religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society,”59 and there is no definitive judicial standard to
determine whether an organization qualifies for the exception. To illustrate the confusion, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in one case issued three opinions, each applying a
different standard, a situation that does more than highlight the varied understanding of the scope
of such exception.60

However, the court later amended its decision and issued a majority opinion adopting
four criteria that a religious organization must satisfy to qualify for the exception.61 The court’s
standard would recognize that an entity is not subject to Title VII “if it is organized for a
religious purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying out that religious purpose, holds itself out to
the public as an entity for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not engage primarily or
substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts.”62 The
Supreme Court declined to review the case, leaving lower courts without a uniform standard to
apply.63 Despite the lack of a uniform standard, lower court decisions have generally appeared to
agree upon several factors relevant to deciding whether an organization qualifies for the
exception.64

59

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1(a) (West 2014).
See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 619 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2010).
61
See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011).
62
Id. at 724.
63
Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 96 (2011).
64
See Footnote 32.
60
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To qualify as a “religious” organization permitted to engage in religious discrimination, an
entity must be owned or significantly controlled by an established religious group.65An
organization may be deemed religious, even if not directly affiliated with a religious group, as
long as it is organized for a religious and ethical purpose and is primarily engaged in pursuing
that purpose, holds itself out to the public as engaging in that defined purpose, and refrains from
significant commercial enterprises.66

(1)

Religious Educational Institutions: Schools and Universities

Another exception in Title VII, §703(e) (2), applies specifically to religious educational
institutions.67

It allows such institutions “to hire and employ employees of a particular

religion if [the institution] is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or
managed by a particular religion or by a particular [organization], or if the curriculum of [the
institution] is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.”68

In Killinger v. Samford Univ., the Eleventh Circuit held that educational institutions
connected to an organized religion claiming the exception will be analyzed in terms of 1) the
extent of the relationship of the school to an organized religious group, 2) the history and stated
mission of the school, 3) the funding and administrative influence on the institution by a
religious order, 4) the religious orientation of its curriculum, and 5) the religious affiliation of its

65

LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Cntr. Ass’n., 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007).
Spencer, 633 F.3d at 742.
67
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (West 2014).
68
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (West 2014).
66
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students and faculty.69

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that seven percent of the school’s funding from the church
was sufficient to make the educational institution “religious.”70 Merely being founded by a
religious organization and maintaining a formal yet distant identification to the specific religion,
however, is not sufficient to make an educational institution “religious,” especially when the
school’s modern mission, goals, activities, finance, direction, and curriculum are predominantly
secular.71

(2)

“Bona Fide Occupational Qualification”

Another exception provided in Title VII allows employers to discriminate on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin if those factors are “a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”72

However, this exception based on bona fide occupational qualifications has been construed
narrowly.73 Accordingly, courts have deemed valid discriminatory qualifications to arise only in
situations where religion plays an extremely significant part of the work environment, including,
for example, jobs where employee safety is threatened because of the employee’s religious

69

113 F.3d 196, 198-201 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 201.
71
E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993).
72
Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
73
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
70
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affiliation.74

b)

Commercial Entities Not Entitled to the Exception

While this immunity has not been held to apply to corporations and purely secular
businesses in a religious discrimination context under Title VII, the Supreme Court may consider
that it does. In EEOC v. Tawney Eng. & Mfg. Co., 75 a purely secular for-profit business required
its employees to attend employer-organized religious services; nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
held that a purely secular for-profit business is not a “religious organization.” 76 As a result, a
secular for-profit entity is thereby not entitled to discriminate on the basis of religion merely
because of its owners’ individual religious beliefs.77
However, the Supreme Court held in the notorious recent case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. that the religious beliefs of a closely held for-profit company's owners trumped the
personal rights of its women employees.78 More specifically, the Court ruled that “person" within
the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)79’s protection of a person's
exercise of religion includes for-profit corporations, even though the RFRA itself does not define
“person."80 The Supreme Court relied on the Dictionary Act’s definition of "person" to reach that
conclusion.81 The Court further stated in Burwell that it has entertained RFRA claims brought by

See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F.Supp. 1196, 1199-1200 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (allowing an employer to require
that helicopter pilots convert to Islam in order to be hired for air surveillance over Mecca because Saudi Arabian law
prohibited any non-Muslim from entering the holy area, a violation punishable by death), aff’d, 746 F.2d 810 (5th
Cir. 1984).
75
EEOC v. Townley Eng. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
79
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.
80
134 S. Ct. at 2768-69.
81
Id. at 2768.
74
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nonprofit corporations because a nonprofit corporation can be a “person” within the meaning of
RFRA, so the argument cannot be made that RFRA does not reach closely held for-profit
corporations.82 In other words, in Justice Alito's words in the majority opinion, “[n]o known
understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some but not all corporations.”83
The Court, however, suggested that its holding did not apply to publicly traded
corporations because of the difficulty of ascertaining the “beliefs” of such corporations and
because it is highly unlikely that such sort of corporate giants will even assert RFRA claims. 84
Likewise, the Court clarified that this ruling did not necessarily apply to other aspects of health
coverage such as transfusions, medications derived from pigs, anesthesia, pills coated with
gelatin, or vaccinations that might be objectionable to a religious owner.85 Lastly, Burwell
seemed to suggest that closely held corporations may not discriminate in hiring based on
"religion," but the majority's list of off-limits discrimination does not include sexual
orientation.86

2. Constitutionality of Exempting Entities from the Prohibition of Discrimination on
Account of Religion

In Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, an employee at a non-profit gymnasium,
affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, challenged the validity of one of
the religious discrimination exceptions granted by Title VII.87 The employee, a janitor, was

Id. at 2769.
Id.
84
Id. at 2773-75.
85
Id. at 2805.
86
Id. at 2783.
87
483 U.S. at 331.
82
83
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terminated from employment because he was not a member of the Mormon Church.88 Arguing
that his activities were merely that of a janitor in a gymnasium open to the public and therefore
non-religious, he claimed that the Exception was unconstitutional for favoring religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause.89 The Court concluded that Congress passed the religious
exception contained in §702 for the purpose of “alleviating significant governmental interference
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”90

The Court further recognized that Congress intended the exceptions under Title VII to
cover “all activities of a religious employer.”91 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
exception did not apply to a janitor position because, as Justice Brennan posited, “determining
that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious mission, and that only
those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious
community defines itself.”92
While the question of the constitutionality of §702 as applied to for-profit activities of
religious organizations was not addressed in Amos,93 Burwell may have implicitly resolved that
question when the Supreme Court upheld a for-profit corporation's free exercise of religion.94 In
that case, the Supreme Court held that a contraceptives mandate under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially burdened the exercise of religion and thus violated the
constitutional and statutory protections of religious freedom of for-profit, closely held

Id.
Id.
90
Id. at 339.
91
Id.
92
Amos, 483 U.S. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93
Id. at 339.
94
134 S. Ct. at 2769.
88
89
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corporations and individuals who owned or controlled the corporations.95 The Court determined
that such action contravened the employers' religious beliefs by forcing them to provide health
insurance coverage for what they sincerely viewed as abortion-inducing drugs and devices, as
well as related education and counseling.96 Since the Supreme Court drew no distinction between
for-profit and nonprofit organizations with respect to the free exercise of religion, such a
distinction may no longer govern the Title VII exceptions.

III.

TITLE VII EXCEPTIONS: WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION AS OPPOSED
TO, SAY, SEX?

Civil rights groups have focused on the narrow question of whether religious organizations
can use religion as a basis for employment decisions without encroaching upon potential
intersections between racial, genders or sexuality related issues.97 Arguably, the exceptions
granted for the prohibition of religious discrimination by Title VII can serve as a shield for
religious organizations from being obligated to hire and retain employees who do not share the
same religious denomination as the institution. The premise is reasonable in theory; however, it
can be wide reaching in practice and inimical to the purpose of Title VII's enactment.

It is one thing to allow religious entities to discriminate based on "religion" and another to
grant them broad discretion to define what constitutes “religious” matters, considering how there
are nearly as many ways to interpret the Bible and other religious texts as there are people on

Id. at 2779.
Id.
97
See, e.g., Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
95
96
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earth. Although religious institutions are allowed to discriminate based only on “religion,” these
institutions can still possibly successfully discriminate based on sex. For instance, although it
was decided almost three decades before Hosanna-Tabor and did not resolve a Title VII claim,
Madsen v. Erwin98 serves to illustrate the dilemma as to whether discrimination is “religious”
(legal) or based on sex (illegal).

In Madsen, which involved the Boy Scouts' exclusionary policies, the plaintiff was
employed as a sportswriter for the Christian Science Monitor, a church-published newspaper.99
When the plaintiff was terminated because of her sexual orientation, she sued, claiming
constitutional, statutory, and common law claims.100 The court held that the plaintiff's civil rights
claims under both the federal and state constitutions could not constitutionally proceed --not
because she was a minister, but because entanglement of the defendants in such litigation would
involve the court in a review of an essentially ecclesiastical procedure, which is impermissible
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.101 Otherwise, the court added, if
Madsen were allowed to collect damages from defendants as a result from being discharged for
being gay, the defendants would be penalized “for their religious belief that homosexuality is a
sin for which one must repent.”102

However, the court in Madsen allowed the plaintiff to proceed with her claims for
defamation, interference with advantageous relations, interference with employment contract,

98

481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985).
Id. at 1161.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1166.
102
Id.
99
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invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress.103 The Madsen court treated the
plaintiff's tort claims differently because “clergymen may not with impunity defame a person,
intentionally inflict serious emotional harm on a parishioner, or commit other torts” and then
claim immunity from liability under the First Amendment's religion provisions.104 Since the
alleged torts constituted conduct outside of the constitutional constraints, they were subject to
regulation.105 Since Hosanna-Tabor did not reach broader questions of tort liability, it is not clear
whether this aspect of Madsen survives, even aside from the question of whether the newspaper
was sufficiently church-related and whether a sportswriter could be viewed as a minister.106

In any event, , the majority in Madsen established that the position involved a religious
activity run by the church and that “‘homosexuality is a deviation from the moral law’ as
expounded by Christian Science, and that it is expected that every employee of the Church will
uphold the Church's requisite standard of sexual morality.”107 Relying upon doctrinal
entanglement concerns and a broad view regarding church autonomy, the court further found that
the church's decision to fire the plaintiff was a religious decision made by a church as an
employer.108

Madsen, 481 N.E.2d at 1167.
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105
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parts of a process of divestiture of priestly authority,” and, therefore, were “too close to the peculiarly religious
aspects of the transaction to be segregated and treated separately as civil wrongs.” Id. at 761.
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More recently and in a Title VII context, the employer in Boyd v. Harding Academy of
Memphis, Inc., 109 a religious school affiliated with the Church of Christ, claimed that
termination of the employee, a preschool teacher, was based on her violation of the
organization’s policy against extra-marital sex, stemming from the New Testament’s
proscription of pre-marital sex. On the other hand, the employee who filed the action claimed
that the action was unlawful sex discrimination based on her unwed pregnancy.110 The court held
that the termination did not violate Title VII because the employer’s decision was based on a
violation of its faith-based policy, not the resulting pregnancy.111

The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that Title VII exempted
religious entities as long as the religious employer made its employment decision upon a
religious basis or criteria.112 The court reasoned that the employer’s reliance on statements that
an assistant in the school made to the director about the plaintiff possibly being pregnant, which,
if true, would mean that the plaintiff engaged in sex outside of marriage, did not establish that
the school’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for her termination was a pretext for gender
discrimination.113

In another case, a teacher claimed violations of Title VII, alleging that the employer, a
religious group, unlawfully discriminated against her when it terminated her from a teaching

(1996) (arguing that the court should have considered whether the plaintiff's job as a writer for the Monitor was
connected to the Church's religious activity).
109 887 F. Supp. 157, 158 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) aff'd, 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 162.
112
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position for being pregnant and unmarried.114 The court found that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether the employer fired the employee because she violated the school's
religious code, or because of her gender and pregnancy.115 In that case, Redhead v. Conference
of Seventh-day Adventists, the Eastern District Court of New York reasoned that, although the
suit was brought against a school operated by a religious organization, the nature of the dispute
was not such that its resolution would inevitably run afoul of the Establishment Clause by
impermissibly entangling the court in matters of religious doctrine because the teacher was not a
clergy member and her duties at the school were primarily secular.116 Thus, the action was not
barred by the ministerial exception to Title VII.117
Unlike Redhead, the teachers in Boyd were required to be Christians and preference was
given to Church of Christ members.118 Moreover, the teacher in that case was aware of the
expectations because she knew that the Harding Academy was a church-related school and
indicated on her employment application that she had a Christian background and believed in
God.119

A.

Courts’ attempt to draw the line between religion and sex in Little and Geary

As these cases illustrate, courts have issued decisions in opposite directions. In Little v.
Wuerl, the Third Circuit ruled that a Catholic school could refuse to renew the contract of a non-
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Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 566 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the
Ministerial Exception did not apply when the employer, Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, argued that the
court lacked jurisdiction because of the Ministerial Exception and claimed that the employee was lawfully
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Catholic teacher whose divorce and remarriage did not conform to Catholic norms.120 The Court
reasoned that "the permission to employ persons ‘of a particular religion’ includes permission to
employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with the employer's religious
precepts."121

Two years later, the same Court held in Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary
Parish School that the religious exception did not provide a shield against an age discrimination
claim by a “lay” teacher who was fired by a church-operated Catholic school for allegedly
marrying a divorced man.122 While the Third Circuit determined that the First Amendment may
prohibit application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) to a religious
organization if there is a significant risk that the First Amendment would be infringed, the Court
concluded that application of the ADEA to the lay faculty of a religious school does not present a
significant risk of entanglement.123 To reach that determination in Geary, the Third Circuit
reasoned that the ADEA's inquiry is only whether the school discriminated against Geary on the
basis of age, and further, whether the School canceled Geary's insurance in retaliation for her
suit.124 While Hosanna-Tabor clearly means that religious employers are exempt from Title VII,
the ADEA, and the ADA as long as they claim the aggrieved employee is a “minister,” the Third
Circuit's reasoning in Geary highlights that this is so when the constitutional protections of the
First Amendment are implicated, but not because the ADEA provides statutory religious
929 F.2d at 951; see also Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (interpreting §
2000e-l(a) to allow religious institutions to give hiring preferences to members of the faith, but not to engage in
other forms of discrimination in the case of an unmarried pregnant teacher fired by a Catholic school). "Indeed, to
construe section 2000e-l to exempt all forms of discrimination in sectarian schools would itself raise first
amendment problems since it would imply the government's preference of sectarian schools over nonsectarian
schools.” Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 269.
121
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exceptions like those that Title VII provides on top of the Ministerial Exception.

Other courts have suggested that gender-neutral policies, such as a policy against premarital
sex by an employee, if applied in a gender-neutral way, avoids potential clashes between a
religious employer's religious views and the obligation to avoid sex discrimination.125

B.

Pregnancy and Lawful Religion Discrimination

The most serious controversies have probably arisen from the treatment of pregnancy by
religious groups in the employment context.126 The Supreme Court itself has had trouble seeing
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as an instance of sex discrimination.127 In Geduldig v.
Aiello, decided in 1974, the Court, composed of all male justices at the time, reasoned that the
two classes of pregnant and non-pregnant persons do not perfectly track gender, as there can be
non-pregnant women and non-pregnant men.128

As a response, Congress promptly amended Title VII to include pregnancy-based
discrimination as a forbidden ground under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; 129 hence,
employers cannot lawfully discriminate on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

See Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344, 359-60 (E.D.N.Y 1998) (holding that a sectarian
private institution "has the right to employ only teachers who adhere to the school's moral code and religious tenets,"
but a factual determination would be necessary to see if even a neutral policy against non-marital sex could be
discriminatory as applied since it may be easier for a school to discover and penalize the sexual activities of female
employees).
126
Minow, supra note 1, at 802.
127
See Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494(1974).
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conditions.130 Therefore, employment actions based on religiously-inspired ideas about
pregnancy could potentially trigger the protection against pregnancy discrimination.131

However, the statutory amendment could neither alter the constitutional interpretation nor
address potential tensions between gender and pregnancy anti-discrimination law in regards to
the exception for religious employers who use religion in employment.132 Thus, when an
unmarried female employee of a religious organization becomes pregnant, a religious employer
may seek to terminate the employment relationship not because of the pregnancy per se but
because the individual engaged in non-marital sexual relations, which is contrary to religious
teachings, or because the individual is no longer an adequate role model.133

In one case, a teacher at a Catholic school lost her job after she became pregnant and
indicated that she did not plan to marry the father.134 The teacher’s termination followed a
positive performance review in which her supervisors praised her superior teaching ability and
her "high degree of professionalism.”135 The matter became one of contract terms since the
teacher had signed a contract accepting the rule in the school's personnel handbook stating that "a
teacher is required to convey the teachings of the Catholic faith by his or her words and actions,
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demonstrating an acceptance of Gospel values and the Christian tradition.”136 However, the
teacher did not file any claim under Title VII or any other anti-discrimination law, leaving this
particular case as a mere illustration of how the arbitrary nature of religious protections can
deprive thousands of teachers, doctors, nurses, and many other professionals of critical
employment protections. While the case did not reach the courts, the decision came in the form
of a ruling from the EEOC.137 The EEOC issued a notice, finding that the school, St. Rose of
Lima in Rockaway Beach, New York, was engaging in unlawful pregnancy discrimination by
firing Michelle McCusker.138
While, in theory, the exception allowing religious employers to discriminate on the basis
of religion does not permit discrimination on the basis of gender or pregnancy per se, a court
could accept a defense that compliance with the Christian tradition is a bona fide occupational
requirement.139 For instance, in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, a case that came before the
District Court in Nebraska involving a discrimination claim brought by an unmarried counselor
that became pregnant, the Omaha Girls' Club successfully defended against it on the theory that
she was supposed to provide a role model to adolescent girls.140 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
decision and later denied rehearing the case.141 In Vigars v. Valley Christian Center of Dublin,
Cal., on the other hand, the District Court for the Northern District of California denied a
summary judgment motion and called for a trial to determine whether the religious school fired
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the librarian because she was pregnant out of wedlock or because she had an adulterous affair.142
Even though both would seem to violate a Christian lifestyle based upon “a widely recognized
and sincerely held belief that extramarital sex is a sin,” the court reasoned that, while childbirth
out of wedlock would be an impermissible reason in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, adultery, otherwise, would be a ground that the Christian school could use to ensure
compliance with a Christian lifestyle.143 After all, the court posited, adultery is inconsistent with
“the religious values of the church and school.”144

However, defendants, a parochial school run by the church, originally asserted in their
motion to dismiss that plaintiff, the teacher, was fired “for the sin of being pregnant out of
wedlock,” as she was “pregnant without benefit of marriage,” but later asserted in their summary
judgment motion that she was fired because “the school learned that she was involved in an
adulterous relationship (i.e., sexual relations with her ‘new’ husband before she was divorced
from her ‘old’ husband),” and the resulting pregnancy was evidence of that adulterous
relationship.”145

C.

Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity Discrimination: Gender Discrimination?
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805 F. Supp. at 810 (denying summary judgment to a Christian school that fired a librarian who got pregnant out
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The United States workforce includes an estimated 5.4 million lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender ("LGBT") persons.146 No federal statute explicitly prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.147 Thus, employers
discriminate against LGBT workers with broad immunity from detrimental effects. 148 In fact,
numerous studies have confirmed that LGBT-related employment discrimination is rampant.149
Lesbian, gay, and bisexual ("LGB") individuals experience sexual orientation-based employment
discrimination at staggering rates: 8% to 17% have been fired or denied employment, 7% to 41%
have been verbally or physically harassed by coworkers, and 10% to 19% have been unfairly
compensated in terms of pay or benefits.150

Transgender persons experience gender identity-based employment discrimination at
even greater rates: 47% have been fired or denied employment, 78% have been verbally or
physically harassed by coworkers, and 7% have been physically assaulted at work.151

1. EEOC’s Decisions Regarding Gender Identity
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The EEOC has found that lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals alleging sex-stereotyping
are asserting sex discrimination claims under Title VII.152 In support of its decision, the
Commission relied on a number of notable cases, including the Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which found that discrimination against an individual for failing to
conform to gender-based stereotypes violates Title VII.153

Therefore, stereotyping that imposes burdens based on different gender characteristics is
forbidden.154 In Price Waterhouse, the Court accepted the concept that “gender stereotyping” is a
form of “sex” discrimination.155 In that case, the plaintiff, a female employee, was denied a
promotion to a partnership in defendant's accounting firm.156 In making their evaluations,
decision-makers made comments such as “overcompensated for being a woman,” “a lady
shouldn’t use such foul language,” and “she was a macho,” and made recommendations that she
should “walk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry.”157 The court reasoned that the plaintiff was being evaluated on the basis of
outward characteristics typically associated with the respective sexes, and that such gender
“stereotyping” constituted sex discrimination.158

Similarly, in Lewis v. Heartland Inns of

America, L.L.C., a hotel admissions desk clerk was dismissed because she had a “tomboyish”
rather than a “pretty, Midwestern girl” appearance.159 The Eighth Circuit held that such a
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stereotype constituted sex discrimination.160

Likewise, discrimination against an individual because that person is transgender (known
as “gender identity discrimination”) is also discrimination because of sex and is therefore
covered under Title VII.161 In its determination in the 2012 case of Macy v. Holder, the EEOC
reversed the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") determination that claims of gender identity
discrimination are ineligible for adjudication under the Executive Order 1614 process and instead
held "that claims of discrimination based on transgender status, also referred to as claims of
discrimination based on gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII's sex discrimination
prohibition.”162

Significantly, because Macy was decided by the full Commission rather than its Office of
Federal Operations, the decision is binding on all executive departments and federal agencies
notwithstanding the fact that Executive Order 11478 does not explicitly include gender identity
among its protected classes.163 Consequently, federal employees who suffer an adverse
employment action because of their gender identity now have the same enforcement rights as
their colleagues who are discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, gender,
national origin, disability, or age.164
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2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Recently, the Commission also issued a potentially groundbreaking decision finding that
discrimination based on "sexual orientation" can be brought under Title VII even without any
further showing of sex stereotyping.165 In so ruling, the Commission rejected several circuit court
decisions that held that Title VII does not include protection from discrimination based on sexual
orientation.166 The Commission held, "[s]exual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination
because it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of the employee's
sex."167 In reaching its conclusion, the Commission held "[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is premised on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or
norms. 'Sexual Orientation' as a concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to
sex."168

While the EEOC has pronounced that sexual orientation falls under sex and is thus covered
under Title VII, the Obama Administration recently announced support for amending the Civil
Rights Act through the Equality Act to protect LGBT people in particular.169 The legislation
would amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by expanding it to include bans on discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, housing, public
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accommodations, public education, federal funding, credit, and the jury system. 170

It is precisely because the White House is working “to ensure that the legislative process
produces something that balances “the bedrock principles of civil rights with the religious liberty
that we hold dear in this country” that the much broader exceptions under Title VII should be
closely and critically reexamined given that they can easily get in the way as a cover for implicit
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity, which Title VII
precisely seeks to prevent.171

a) Sexual Orientation and Lawful Religion Discrimination

Unfortunately, because of the relatively few opinions that address sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws in the face of religious objection, the Supreme Court has yet to consider the
question.172 Generally, the lower courts have sided with religious organizations on claims of
discrimination based on sexual orientation.173

While not a Title VII victory but hopefully persuasive in some way, two gay student
groups won their challenge, as a statutory matter, to Georgetown University's refusal to grant
them recognition and access to the kind of resources given to other recognized student groups
under the local human rights code in Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center
Id.
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v. Georgetown University.174 However, the University did not have to “recognize” the group
since that would be a religious endorsement.175 Subsequently, Congress, having the authority
over the District of Columbia, responded by amending the human rights code.176 As a result,
anti-discrimination norms began to judicially trump claims by religious groups.177 Although
claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have not generated victories for
plaintiffs suing religious organizations, neither have they done much to clarify the law.178

In Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., a Baptist social service agency
in Kentucky, the state's largest provider of services for troubled youth, fired a therapist for being
a lesbian.179 The plaintiff, Alice Pedreira, disclosed her sexual orientation during the hiring
interview, and the director assured her that there was no policy against hiring gays or lesbians
but that she should be discreet nonetheless.180 After a photograph showing Pedreira wearing a tshirt reading “Isle of Lesbos” and posing with her partner, taken before she took the job,
appeared at an amateur photo display at the state fair, the agency asked for her resignation.181
Since she declined to resign, she was fired.182
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Pedreira argued that because the agency received much of its revenues from government
contracts, the government was illegally funding religiously based employment policies.183
Therefore, the agency indicated it would refuse further government contracts rather than alter its
policies.184 Still, the court sided with the Kentucky Baptist Homes, reasoning that the agency was
allowed to ensure that the conduct of its employees remained consistent with its Christian
mission and values.185 This case raised questions as to how broadly to define an organization's
religious tenets as it led to the inquiry of whether “Pedreira's firing [was] a discriminatory
dismissal based upon her sexual orientation” or “due to her being unable to uphold the religious
mission or principles of her employer.”186

IV.

CONCLUSION

When a religious institution described in §702 and §703 is able to show convincing
evidence that the challenged employment practice resulted from discrimination on the basis of
religion, the EEOC is deprived of jurisdiction to further investigate the matter to determine
whether the religious discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination.187 Yet,
discrimination might not be clear on its face, specifically if perpetuated and acted upon to
presumably protect the entity’s “religious” beliefs and practices and to further its “religious”
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mission, even if there is another actual hidden motive. In some cases, an employer may claim
that it had a valid discriminatory reason for the discharge based on religion, while the employee
claims the discharge is based on some other Title VII prohibition and therefore improper.

Considering how scriptures from which religious precepts have been used to defend
slavery, demean women, oppress any number of groups in the past, and even kill people, these
statutory exceptions should be re-examined. There should be a more reasonably approach in
place or a set of clear factors that courts should be able to consider uniformly. Perhaps it is up to
the legislature, not the judiciary, to take more effective action. Arguably, this may raise
entanglement concerns. However, some may argue that the exceptions can be waived or denied
when their implications have the potential to pose a threat to other protections and liberties
granted by Title VII or even the Constitution.

Otherwise, the implication is that an individual removes himself or herself from the
protections of the civil rights laws by working for a religious organization even if it is in a nonministerial capacity. As a consequence, there is no clear distinction as to where permissible
religious beliefs end and impermissible political views begin. Such suggestion is not reasonable
for an individual, for instance, whose faith and religion has played a fundamental role in shaping
his or her concept of identity and personhood and who wants to forge an employment
relationship with a religious group but who happens to either become pregnant while single or be
a single mother or be gay, lesbian or transgender. How does that person reconcile his or her own
free exercise of religion and faith with his or her identity?
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